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Abstract 
 
This article focuses on the life insurance industry in France and attempts to shed light on 
whether the insurers behave in a competitive fashion, or whether, on the contrary, they take 
coordinated decisions. We propose several empirical tests, which entail the estimation of the 
Boone indicator, a tool which explores the relationship between firms’ relative costs and 
profits, the evaluation of the switching costs beard by consumers when they decide to change 
insurer, and the construction of a structural model, which is based on an oligopolistic 
framework where insurers propose differentiated products. Our results suggest 
unambiguously that firms do follow a competitive behavior. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The life insurance industry in France represents roughly 5 percent of the French GDP in 
2014.
3
 Given that the products supplied depend on future investment returns, it is important 
for each consumer to choose an insurer adequately, and to make sure that firms propose good 
quality services. The question of the existence and the degree of competition in this sector is 
therefore crucial in terms of the consumer welfare. 
Various factors that are specific to the life insurance industry, mostly on the demand 
side, may affect the intensity of competition across insurers. In particular, high switching 
costs are standard in life insurance policies, given that contracts are of a long-term nature and 
that early termination on the part of the consumer entails monetary costs. Moreover, the 
consumer power may be limited due to the very high complexity of life insurance products 
and the fact that insurers use product differentiation. This paper attempts to shed light on 
whether the insurers behave in a competitive fashion, or whether, on the contrary, they 
coordinate their decision in one way or another.  
 The methodology we propose here is quite different from what has been proposed so 
far in the economic literature interested in the detection of the existence of competition in the 
life insurance industry. Previous studies have appraised the intensity of competition through 
the estimation of firms’ cost functions to evaluate the returns to scale in the industry and 
measure efficiency. It is expected that efficiency is observed in market with increased 
competition; however, substantial cost economies may result in a more concentrated industry 
that would facilitate collusive pricing behavior, while decreasing returns may entail a large 
number of firms producing only a small range and scale of outputs, which facilitates 
competition in the industry. Grace and Timme (1992), Gardner and Grace (1993), and 
Cummins and Zi (1998) produce several types of results which exploit this line of research. 
They use data on U.S. life insurers and shed light on the existence of scale economies for 
smaller firms while larger companies seem to face constant (or even decreasing) returns. 
Other studies have used reduced forms techniques such as the Boone indicator, which is based 
on the idea that an efficient firm beneficiates from higher market shares and hence higher 
profits than a less efficient one; the more vigorous this effect, the more competitive the 
market. Bikker and Van Leuvensteijn (2008) apply this technique to the Dutch life insurance 
industry and conclude that competition is rather limited.  
                                                 
3
 Source : Fédération Française de l’Assurance (FFA), http://www.ffa-assurance.fr/. 
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Here, we adopt an approach which consists in evaluating the intensity of competition. 
Three main methods are proposed: First, we propose an indirect measure of competition using 
the Boone indicator. 
Second, we evaluate consumers’ switching costs for each insurance company's and 
each year. Economists have suggested that switching costs confer market power to firms and 
thus reduce the competitive pressure within a market. These costs are usually endogenous in 
the sense that they are the result of economic strategies to attract or lock-in consumers. We 
show, using a theoretical model of competition between several companies, how optimal 
saving rates are determined and how switching costs affect these rates. A comparison with 
other industries is proposed to quantify the magnitude of these switching costs.  
Finally, we propose a structural approach which is based on an oligopolistic 
framework where insurers propose differentiated products; we build a full equilibrium system 
where consumers’ demand and firms’ markups are considered jointly. On the one hand, the 
elasticity of demand determines how attractive it is for a firm to unilaterally change its prices. 
On the other hand, the expression of firms’ markups captures the essence of firms’ strategic 
interaction, and allows us to test whether companies compete against each other as predicted 
by the theory, or whether they are engaged in a collusive arrangement. Differentiated product 
industries present complex strategic interactions among asymmetric products and insurers. 
Our methodology comprises a logit-type model to represent consumer choice and to explain 
market shares measured in terms of the number of policies held by each insurer. The logit 
model is rich enough to capture the basic nature of the competitive interaction and has been 
used extensively in the estimation of demand parameters. Earlier applications have been to 
transportation (see for instance Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985, or Train, 1986), but it is used 
nowadays in the modeling of competition in differentiated products industries (see Anderson 
and de Palma, 1992, and Anderson, de Palma and Thisse, 1992). Our empirical strategy 
decomposes into two steps: First, we estimate a demand function based on a logit 
specification in order to evaluate the elasticity of demand. Second, this elasticity is 
incorporated into two pricing equations which state that the observed firms’ markups are 
equal to (i) a theoretical markup which assumes that firms behave in a (Nash-Bertrand) 
competitive fashion, or (ii) a theoretical markup which states that firms collude. Our results 
suggest unambiguously that firms do follow a competitive behavior. 
Our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our dataset and the different 
variables that are used in the empirical analysis. Section 3 proposes an indirect measure of 
competition using the Boone indicator. Section 4 focuses on the evaluation of the insurers’ 
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switching costs, while Section 5 discusses how these costs change with firms’ size. Section 6 
presents the structural model. It discusses the empirical results based on the estimation of the 
demand function and presents two formal tests based on the competitive behavior of the 
insurers. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Data 
 
We use the accounting database provided by the Fédération Française de l’Assurance (FFA) 
over the period 2005-2011. In order to elaborate the profit functions of the insurance 
companies, we extract information from the so-called C1 ratios, ‘Etats C20’, ‘compte de 
résultats techniques’, and ‘états récapitulatifs des placements’.4 We focus exclusively on 
individual/group insurance contracts, which are opened in euros (or any other currency) since 
insurance companies commit in this activity to pay consumers a specific saving rate. In other 
words, the process in which insurance companies propose a saving rate to attract consumers is 
the competitive game we want to model. Considering unit-linked policies would not allow 
testing an economic model in which the insurance companies have a clearly defined strategic 
behavior, given that the outcome is uncertain in this case.
 5
 
The initial database contains 113 different insurance contracts observed between 2005 
and 2011. Considering all these contracts is problematic as the heterogeneity between the 
different companies may be very important. For example, AXA France Vie opened 434.552 
new contracts in 2009 while Avip Life received only 385 new contracts in 2008. It is 
therefore not reasonable to consider that these two companies are direct competitors. Another 
type of difficulty is that the same company may offer several types of products, some of 
which are more important than others in terms of visibility to consumers. This is the case for 
example of Crédit Agricole which holds Dolcea Life (1674 new contracts in 2011), Spirica 
(6,454 new contracts in 2011) and Predica (604,389 new contracts in 2011). We chose to 
retain only the largest life insurance product for each company. We have also chosen to 
                                                 
4
 The so-called ratios C1, ‘états C1’, and ‘états C20’ provide information on the individual financial accounts of 
the insurers. The ratios C1 focus mainly on interest rates such as the management cost of a life insurance 
contract or the saving rate on investment. The ‘états C1’ concern the financial flows that are specific to each 
company and the états C20 include information on the quantities of contracts held by insurer. The ‘compte de 
résultat’ technique and the ‘état récapitulatif des placements’ focus on the investments made by the insurer with 
the help of the capital of the holders of the life insurance contracts.  
5
 When a customer purchases a life insurance contract, he has the choice between a contract in euros and a 
contract in unit-linked policies which are invested in the stock market. Unlike a contract in euros, the capital in 
this latter case is not guaranteed; the consumer is therefore the one who supports the risk. As the capital is 
invested in financial markets, it is subject to upwards and downwards fluctuations. 
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eliminate the insurance companies for which the stock of contracts is less than 100,000 in 
2011 to avoid the heterogeneity issues mentioned above, and because it is not clear that small 
companies are located throughout the country and constitute relevant competitors to large 
companies. 
The final database therefore includes the following 13 life insurance companies: 
Allianz, Groupama, Generali, Sogecap, Axa, BNP-Paribas, Covea, Macif, MAIF, Credit 
Mutuel, Credit Agricole, Swiss Life, and CNP Assurances. Note that two contracts are 
proposed by Covea, which implies a total of 14 life insurance contracts. Table 1 provides 
descriptive statistics of the variables that are used in our economic model. Note that the 
average saving rate in the database is 3.9%, while the average rate of return is 5%, and the 
average operating cost (management fee) is equal to 0.4%. In other words, the average margin 
per contract is computed as the difference between the rate of return, the saving rate, and the 
operating cost, which is equal to 0.7%. Also note that each insurance company opened an 
average of 122.912 new contracts each year. Moreover, there is still a significant gap across 
companies’ production levels since the minimum and maximum are 898 and 1,238,934 new 
annual contracts respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (period 2005 - 2011) 
 
Variable Description Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
iw  
Rate of return : Investment product  divided 
by total investment  
5.0% 0.4% 3.2% 8.1% 
ir  Saving rate 3.9% 0.2% 2.7% 4.9% 
ic  Operating cost 0.4% 0.1% 0.01% 1.5% 
iN  New contracts at date t 122,912 78,711 898 1,237,934 
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Figure 1: Average margins (2005-2011) 
 
 
 
 The average margin per life insurance contract can be computed for each year of our 
observation period (2005-2011), as shown in Figure 1 above. It is noteworthy that the average 
saving rate proposed to the consumers increases slightly between 2005 and 2008, but 
decreases significantly afterwards. At the same time, the average rate of return received by the 
insurance companies and their operating costs are more or less constant over the same period. 
This suggests a significant increase in the margins of the insurance companies after 2008, and 
calls for further investigation on the behavior of firms. Indeed, higher margins could be a 
signal that the degree of competition is lessened. Whether this is actually the case in the 
French life insurance sector is an important issue that needs to be addressed with economic 
tools that account for consumers’ demand and firms’ strategic behavior. We turn now to the 
description and the implementation of these tools. 
 
3. An evaluation of competition with the Boone indicator 
 
An indirect measure of competition can be derived in terms of firms’ efficiency. This 
approach, proposed by Boone (2004), is based on the idea that competition helps identifying 
the most efficient companies. Indeed, a more efficient company enjoys a larger market share 
and gets higher profits than a less efficient one. A crucial point of this theory is that the 
stronger this effect, the more competitive the market.  
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 The intuition to test this idea is simple: If the industry is competitive, it should be true 
that the relative benefit between pairs of firms is inversely proportional to the relative 
marginal cost. In other words, firm i’s relative benefit (with respect to firm j) should increase 
if firm i’s relative marginal cost (with respect to firm j) decreases. Hence, the empirical model 
consists in estimating the following relation in logarithmic terms:  
 
 
iti
jt
it
jt
it εθtβ
c
c
ββ
π
π
 321 lnln , (1) 
 
where 1 , 2β , and 3  are parameters to be estimated, it  is the profit of firm i at period t, itc  
is the marginal cost of firm i at period t, t is a trend, and 
it  is an error term.  
 Note that the estimation of Equation (1) requires constructing relative profit 
jtit   
and marginal cost 
jtit cc  indexes for all potential insurers’ pairs of our database. To account 
for possible differences in unobserved characteristics of insurers, which cannot be explained 
by the relative marginal cost, we rely on the panel data structure of our dataset and introduce 
firms’ fixed effects 
iθ . These unobserved characteristics cover items like the productive 
efficiency of insurers, the productivity of inputs, the managerial effort, or marketing 
strategies. We provide estimates of these unobserved individual effects. 
The main parameter of interest is the Boone indicator 2 . This parameter must be 
negative since the insurance companies that have the lowest relative marginal costs are those 
that have the highest relative profits. The larger this parameter (in absolute value), the more 
competitive the market. The parameter 
3  which is associated with the trend t is also an 
important factor since it measures the extent by which the average difference between the 
profits of the insurance companies varies over time. A positive parameter indicates that the 
average difference between profits increases, which would contradict the fact that the 
companies collude on the saving rate. In other words, a positive parameter 
3 setting is good 
news at the moment of trying to prove that the life insurance market is competitive. 
 The ordinary least squares estimates of Equation (1) are presented in Table 2 below. 
Several types of estimates are presented. First, the seven left columns provide results based on 
cross section data, that is to say, a specific year is used for each estimate. The two right 
columns consider all years simultaneously with or without fixed effects. In all cases, the 
parameter 2  is negative and highly significant, suggesting that the insurance industry is 
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indeed competitive. This impression is reinforced by the parameter 
3  which is positive and 
highly significant as well, suggesting that the average difference between the profits of the 
insurance companies increases over time. 
The value of the Boone parameter that seems most reliable is the one associated with 
the panel data framework and the fixed effects, that is to say, 
2 0,36   . This value indicates 
that a 1% decrease in the relative marginal cost of a company leads to an increase of its 
relative profit of 0.36%. To ease the interpretation of this value, it may be useful to compare it 
with those obtained in other studies. For instance, Bikker Leuvensteijn and Van (2008) use 
the same type of indicator in order to measure competition in the life insurance sector in the 
Netherlands between 1995 and 2003. They obtain an indicator of a similar average magnitude 
( -0.45) and acknowledge the existence of a significant competition in the Netherlands. It may 
also be useful to focus on the results obtained by researchers working on other industries such 
as the manufacturing sector: Creusen, Minne and van der Wiel (2006) obtain values that range 
between -5.7 and -2.7 for the Dutch case between 1993 and 2001. While it is problematic to 
compare indicators obtained in different industries, these results suggest that the Dutch 
manufacturing industry is certainly more competitive than the life insurance in France.  
 Table 3 presents estimated values of the companies’ fixed effects. It illustrates the fact 
that there are indeed differences in unobserved characteristics of several insurers, which 
cannot be explained by the relative marginal cost. In other words, insurers’ know-how may 
also be an important ingredient to explain differences in profits.  
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 9 
 
 
 
Table 2: Evaluation of insurers’ economic efficiency 
 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2005-11 2005-11 
Parameter          
β1 
 
-1.49
*** 
(0.26) 
 
-0.49 
(0.30) 
 
-0.38 
(0.22) 
 
0.53
***
 
(0.20) 
 
-0.04 
(0.19) 
 
0.46
** 
(0.22) 
 
-0.09 
(0.14) 
 
-1.51
***
 
(0.21) 
 
-1.18
***
 
(0.50) 
β2 
 
-0.49
***
 
(0.14) 
 
-0.15 
(0.17) 
 
-1.11
***
 
(0.15) 
 
-1.22
***
 
(0.17) 
 
-1.28
***
 
(0.18) 
 
-0.85
**
 
(0.19) 
 
-0.70
*** 
(0.13) 
 
-0.69
***
 
(0.06) 
 
-0.36
***
 
(0.07) 
β3        
 
0.35
*** 
(0.05) 
 
0.34
*** 
(0.05) 
σε 
 
2.05
***
 
(0.14) 
 
2.29
***
 
(0.16) 
 
1.56
***
 
(0.11) 
 
1.66
***
 
(0.12) 
 
1.45
***
 
(0.11) 
 
1.96
***
 
(0.15) 
 
1.39
***
 
(0.10) 
 
1.89
***
 
(0.05) 
 
1.72
***
 
(0.05) 
Fixed effects        No Yes 
R
2 
        0.32 
# of observations 69 69 61 69 55 79 105 507 507 
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Table 3: Individual fixed effects 
 
Firm Parameter Estimation 
X θ1 
 
0.79
** 
(0.33) 
Y θ2 
 
0.57
*
 
(0.31) 
Z θ10 
 
0.80
***
 
(0.31) 
V θ12 
 
-0.64
*
 
(0.35) 
W θ14 
 
-2.32
***
 
(0.33) 
Note : Non-significant fixed-effects are not shown. 
 
 
4. An evaluation of switching costs 
 
Switching costs include all monetary or psychological costs incurred by a consumer when 
changing insurer. These costs are of different types. They comprise direct costs, such as 
transaction costs (e.g., cost of opening or closing a bank account), indirect costs such as 
research costs (when a consumer chooses a product best suited to its needs) or learning (costs 
that could be involved when investing in a new product) and finally psychological costs. 
 If these costs are small, one can assume that clients can easily move between contracts 
and between suppliers. It would then be a signal of a competitive market. In other words, 
measuring the level of switching costs is a measure of the degree of competition. 
There are very few empirical studies providing orders of magnitude on the switching 
costs or attempting to identify their determinants. Three types of empirical analysis are 
usually implemented in the literature: (i) A direct measure of switching costs, (ii) the 
identification of the determinants of individual choices, using an analysis on stated 
preferences (marketing approach), or an analysis on revealed preferences (econometric 
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approach), and (iii) the analysis of market frictions, in a static or a dynamic setting, through 
the identification of supply and demand forces using econometric methods.
6
 
The first type of analysis is historically the oldest. It has the advantage of providing a 
measure of switching costs with a minimal information requirement but it does not allow to 
identify the determinants of these costs. Moreover it has become “standard” in the sense that 
it is frequently used by competition authorities in their analysis of the degree of competition. 
It is also often supplemented by direct measurements of the degree of competition. In a way, a 
direct measurement of the switching costs and the level of competition are preliminary steps 
that are both necessary to provide a fair descriptive analysis of the sector under consideration 
and to provide a first response to concerns regarding the competitive forces at stake in an 
industry. This is the type of analysis that we consider here. 
We propose a model of competition between insurance companies based on Shy 
(2002), which allows us to assess the switching costs imposed by companies to consumers. 
The equilibrium concept used here differs slightly from the Bertrand-Nash behavior, and is 
denoted the improvement-proof equilibrium. Unlike the Nash-Bertrand type of behavior, 
where each competitor assumes that the rival insurer does not alter its saving rate, the 
improvement-proof environment allows firms to be “ready” to improve their saving rate 
whenever profitable. It is assumed that life insurance companies take two types of strategic 
decision: (i) First, they set a switching cost for consumers, and (ii) second, they set a saving 
rate for their life insurance contract. We focus on the second step and build a competition 
model in which life insurance companies compete in saving rates. They determine the saving 
rate that maximizes their profit, and this saving rate is conditional on the switching cost set in 
the first step (i). Once we have determined the strategic behavior of insurance companies, we 
can retrieve the values of the switching costs for each company using our data 
We proceed now to the construction of the economic model. The profit function of a 
life insurance company is denoted as 
 
   ititititit Ncrw  , (2) 
 
                                                 
6
 In a study on the existence of competition in an industry, the third type of analysis is by far the most relevant. 
However it requires richer databases insofar as it must include observations on the quantities and prices of all 
goods and services produced to allow a successful implementation. The second type of analysis involves 
conducting consumer surveys to identify the determinants of their individual choices between different products. 
The advantage of this approach is that it would allow to better capture the observable heterogeneity of 
individuals and products in the analysis.  
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where 
it  measures the profit of company i, itw  is the rate of return, itr  is the saving rate, itc  
is the operating cost, and 
itN  is the quantity of contracts sold at period t. Moreover, we need 
to model customers’ choice. The utility of the consumer of product i is 
itit rU   if it sticks to 
the same insurance company, and 
ititit rU   if it changes company. Note that itδ  is 
specific to a life insurance company (not consumer specific). 
Take the case of two firms i and j which are competing against each other. They are 
characterized by distinct switching costs and saving rates. They beneficiate from 
itN  et jtN  
customers, meaning that, at the beginning, 
itN  consumers have purchased company i’s 
product and 
jtN  consumers have purchased company j’s product. For company i, the choice 
of a saving rate 
ir  impacts the level iq  of its own demand. The latter depends on the position 
of 
ir  with respect to jr  and iδ  as suggested by the following graph: 
 
 
 
Graph 1: Setting the saving rate itr  
 
Improving the saving rate of the competitor, i.e., setting 
jtjtit rr  , allows capturing the 
competitor’s demand. Hence, the quantity 
itq  of consumers that purchase company i’s 
product is defined as follows : 
 









            .if0
,if
                      ,if
jtjtit
jtjtitjtjtit
jtjtitjtit
it
rr
rrrN
rrNN
q



 
 
To capture a consumer, a firm must subsidize the switching cost itδ  beard by the consumer. 
One can then determine for each firm i the optimal saving rate 
itr  which maximizes its profit. 
A higher rate allows capturing more consumers but is more costly. On the other hand, a lower 
rate is more profitable for the insurance company but increases the probability that the 
0 Nit+Njt Nit 
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competitor sets a higher saving rate and captures the whole demand. Hence, each firm i 
determines the optimal rate 
itr  under the constraint: 
 
      jtitjtititjtjtjtjtjtjt NNcrwNcrw   . (3) 
 
This constraint implies that firm j must not obtain a higher profit by improving the rate 
itr  and 
capturing the whole demand 
jtit NN   compared to a situation where it serves only its own 
base 
jtN .  
 Omitting the index t for simplification, a pair of saving rates  ERjERi rr ,  constitutes an 
improvement proof equilibrium if 
 
     
     
j j j j j j i i j i j
i i i i i i j j i j i
s r c N s r c N N
s r c N s r c N N
 
 
        

       
 
 
To find the equilibrium pair  ERjERi rr , , one needs to solve the system : 
 
     
     
j j j j j j i i j i j
i i i i i i j j i j i
s r c N s r c N N
s r c N s r c N N
 
 
        

       
 
 
Then one obtains the expression of the optimal saving rate for each insurer:  
 
 
         
jiji
jijjjiijiijjjii
i
NNNN
NNNδNNδNNNcsNcs
r



22
22
, (4) 
and 
 
         
ijij
ijiiijjijjiiijj
j
NNNN
NNNδNNδNNNcsNcs
r



22
22
. (5) 
 
These expressions allow performing several types of simulation. Knowing the different 
characteristics of each insurance company, it is possible to simulate any pair of saving rate 
ir  
and 
jr . 
Note that, according to Equations (4) and (5), increasing the switching costs reduces 
the saving rates. Indeed, higher switching costs make it harder for the consumer to move from 
an insurance company to another, which reduces the competitive pressure within the industry. 
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To measure the state of competition in the industry, it is important to assess the 
switching costs imposed by insurance companies onto the customers. As companies behave 
optimally and maximize profits, the optimal saving rates defined in equations (4) and (5) are 
those that we observe in our database. We can then retrieve an assessment of the switching 
costs from the same maximization program as the one defined above. However, since we 
want to evaluate the switching cost for each company, we need to generalize the previous 
program to a case where more than two companies compete. 
Assume now that I firms compete against each other. In each period t, insurers 
determines the optimal saving rate 
itr , .,...,1 Ii   The most profitable company is the one with 
the largest market share. The least profitable is the one with the smallest market share. The 
smallest firm has the highest incentives to improve the profitability of the others. We rank the 
companies by size: 
 
IttIittt NNNNN  121 ...... . 
 
Each firm i competes against I and determines the optimal 
itr  under the constraint  
 
      ItitItititItItItItItIt NNcrsNcrs   . (6) 
 
Firms that propose their consumers a saving rate that is too small face the risk that their 
competitors improve their offer. From this condition one derives directly: 
 
    
Itit
It
ItItItItitItit
NN
N
crwcrw

 . (7) 
 
This expression allows computing a switching cost for each firm and each year. As the 
smallest firm I is the reference that allows computing a switching cost for all the other 
competitors, we cannot compute 
Itr . 
Recall that we suggested above that the switching cost 
it  is specific to the insurer i. 
However, it also provides an indication on the characteristics of the consumers who purchase 
their products from i. Indeed, at the equilibrium, the distribution of consumers across the 
different insurance companies depends on consumers’ switching costs. The difference in the 
switching costs is highlighted by the fact that the consumers with the lowest switching costs 
are those who change insurer more easily and therefore buy products from insurance 
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companies that offer higher saving rates. Conversely, consumers with the highest switching 
costs are present within insurance companies that offer the lowest saving rates. It is therefore 
expected that the larger institutions are those that offer the lowest saving rates and capture the 
consumers who have the highest switching costs. 
The results of the computation of switching costs from Equation (7) are presented in 
Tables 4a and 4b below. Annual values for the entire industry are presented as well as 
individual values for each insurance company over the 2005-2011 period. The average 
switching cost for the whole period is equal to 1.3%, suggesting that a consumer will have to 
bear a cost equivalent to 1.3% of the amount of its life insurance contract if s-he wishes to 
change insurer. Annual assessments suggest an increase of the switching cost over the period 
studied. In addition, individual assessments shed light on potentially large differences 
between the different insurers, as switching costs vary between 0.58%. and 2.21%. 
How should we interpret these results? First we compare them with other values obtained 
by other researchers in studies conducted in other industries. For example, Shy (2002) 
estimates the costs of switching costs for banks in Finland in 1997 and obtains values close to 
10 to 20% of the amounts held on current accounts of consumers. In addition, Kim Kliger and 
Vale (2003) estimate the switching costs in the bonds market in Norway between 1988 and 
1996. They obtain mean values that are equivalent to changes in interest rate equal to 4.12%. 
If we stick only to these results, the values obtained in our study suggest that the switching 
costs in the life insurance industry in France are rather low. Moreover, as we have already 
noted, switching costs are quite heterogeneous from an insurance company to another, which 
eases customer mobility across firms. These empirical evidences are consistent with a rather 
competitive industry.  
 
 
Table 4a: Average switching cost in the industry 
 Switching cost i  (in %)  
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2005-11  
All firms 1.18 0.77 0.99 1.37 1.31 1.63 1.51 1.30  
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Table 4b: Average switching cost per insurer 
Insurer 2005 - 2011 
A 1.13 
B 0.58 
C 0.90 
D 1.61 
E 1.60 
F 1.90 
G 0.72 
H 1.52 
I 0.78 
J 2.21 
K 2.12 
L Réf 
M 0.58 
N 1.91 
O 0.66 
 
 
5. Switching costs and firms’ size 
 
We now propose to assess empirically the link between the switching cost and the 
characteristics of the insurance companies with the following equation:  
 
 
itiititit εξXαtαNααδ  4321 lnln , (8) 
 
where the switching cost 
it  of firm i at time t is computed from Equation (7), k , ,4,...,1k  
is a set of parameters to be estimated, 
itN  is the quantity of life-insurance contracts sold, t is a 
trend, 
itX  accounts for the characteristics of observed health insurance company, namely the 
nature of the company (1 if mixed, 0 if life/capitalization), or the distribution mode (which 
takes value 1 if i is a company with intermediaries, and 0 if the latter is a company with 
financial offices or direct sales), 
iξ  is a set of individual and non-observable fixed-effects, et 
itε  is an error term. 
 Once again, the introduction of fixed effects 
iξ  for each insurance company allows us 
to take into account the possible presence of differences in the unobserved characteristics of 
the insurance companies, which influence the switching cost 
it  and cannot be explained by 
the factors introduced in equation (8). These unobserved characteristics may be related to the 
productive efficiency of the insurance companies, the productivity of the inputs, the 
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managerial effort or the strategies implemented by the company. The fixed effects are also 
appropriate here to address the particular nature of our panel dataset as each insurance 
company is observed over several periods. 
The results are shown in Table 5 below. The first column does not take into account 
the nature of the company or the distribution method contrary to columns 2 and 3. The results 
suggest that the size of the company, measured by the quantity of contracts sold, influences 
positively and significantly the switching cost. If the number of contracts increases by 1%, the 
switching cost rise is of 0.21%. One may argue that the larger the company’s market share, 
the less risky, and the higher the associated switching cost. Only a structural model could be 
used to test this conjecture. 
Moreover, the parameter 
3  associated with the trend t is positive and significant, 
which implies that the average switching cost of the industry increases over the period, all 
other things being equal. The nature of the company (mixed or life/capitalization) does not 
seem to impact on the switching cost since the associated parameter is not significant. 
However, the results suggest that companies with intermediaries are characterized by lower 
switching costs compared to those with financial desks or direct sales. 
 
Table 5: Determinants of the switching costs 
 
Parameter Variable  Estimation 
α1 Constant  
 
-3.10
***
 
(0.17) 
 
-2.42
*** 
(0.43) 
 
-2.48
 
(3.06) 
α2 itN   
 
0.21
***
 
(0.02) 
 
0.21
*** 
(0.02) 
 
0.21
*** 
(0.02) 
α3 Trend  
 
0.06
***
 
(0.01) 
 
0.06
*** 
(0.01) 
 
0.06
*** 
(0.01) 
α4 Mixed    
 
-0.61 
(3.05) 
α4 Life/capitalization   
 
-0.67
* 
(0.38) 
 
σε   
 
0.17
***
 
(0.00) 
 
0.17
*** 
(0.00) 
 
0.17
*** 
(0.00) 
Fixed effects   Yes Yes Yes 
# of observations   96 96 96 
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6. A structural model 
 
The objective now is to produce a direct measure of the degree of competition. To do so our 
empirical strategy consists in estimating an equilibrium model of the insurance industry in 
order to identify the conduct of players on the supply side, i.e., insurers. We first estimate a 
demand function in order to retrieve information on the demand elasticity parameter. In a 
second step, we use this information to test whether insurers behave competitively or 
ccoperatively. This require to derive the two pricing conditions which assume that the 
industry is competitive, or is affected by collusion between firms. 
 
6.1. Demand 
The demand for life insurance is derived from a qualitative choice model which describes 
situations in which consumers choose from a finite and exhaustive set of mutually exclusive 
alternatives. The structure of preferences for a representative consumer is represented by a 
logit specification. (See Werden, Froeb and Tardiff, 1996, for an extended pedagogical 
discussion of this methodology.) A consumer chooses a life insurance product among a set of 
I possible products, which are indexed by i, and are supplied by I different insurers. Hence, i 
may denote alternatively a product or the insurer who proposes this product. There is an 
additional choice, denoted as the outside option, which is referred by index 0 in what follows. 
The outside option corresponds to any alternative which is not a life insurance product, i.e., it 
may be for instance another saving product, or any regular checking account. Hence, there are 
a total of 1I  products. See figure 2 below. 
 
  Figure 2: Structure of choices 
 
 
Product X 
X 
Product Y Outside Option … … 
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 The consumer selects at period t the alternative i to maximize utility itU . The utility 
associated to the choice i at period t is denoted as  
 
 
itiitit rU   . (9) 
 
Hence, each choice i depends on three components: The saving rate 
itr , a firm fixed-effect i , 
and a random term 
it . The sensitivity of the utility to the saving rate is measured by the 
parameter  . The latter is expected to be positive as consumers value a higher saving rate, 
i.e., the demand for a life insurance product i increases with the saving rate proposed by the 
insurance company i. The firm fixed-effect 
i  may also be re-interpreted as a switching cost. 
We return on this point in more details below. Finally, the random component 
it  combines 
all variables that are not observable by the analyst and play a role in the consumer choices. 
 Individual utility maximization yields choice probabilities. Indeed, a consumer prefers 
insurer i over insurer j if  
 
 
jtit UU  . (10) 
 
Hence, the probability that the insurer i is selected is  
 
   tititjtit NnsUU Pr . (11) 
 
In the previous expression, 
itn  measures the total number of life insurance policies held by 
the insurer i, and Nt denotes the market size, such that  
 
 
Itttttt nnnnnN  ...3210 . (12) 
 
Thus, the probabilities are expressed in terms of insurers’ market shares. An important issue, 
which is related to the number of policies associated with the outside alternative 
tn0 , will be 
discussed in more details in what follows.  
 The logit model allows us to transform the probability expressed in Equation (11) and 
derives the market share 
its  as 
 
 
itiittit rss   0lnln , (13) 
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where 
0s  is the market share of the outside alternative. This expression is referred as the 
demand equation which relates the (relative) market share 
its  of insurer i to a saving rate itr , a 
fixed effect 
i , and a random term it . 
 
6.2. Pricing 
Two pricing scenarios, which constitute the core of our test on competition, are now 
considered: In the competitive situation, firms adopt a Bertrand-Nash behavior; otherwise, in 
a collusive case, firms tacitly coordinate their pricing strategies. We now present these two 
hypotheses of market equilibrium. 
 
Competition 
In a competitive environment, insurance companies are said to adopt a Bertrand-Nash 
behavior in the sense that they compete against each other strategically. Each company 
chooses the saving rate 
itr  that maximizes profit it , given that the other companies are 
choosing their saving rates in the same way. Hence, the objective of each firm is  
 
   ititititit
r
ncrwMax
it
 . (14) 
 
Each company trades off two effects when considering a decrease in the saving rate 
itr  
proposed to the consumers: On the one hand, it increases profits, and this increase is 
proportional to the current number of life insurance policies 
itn  held by the firm. On the other 
hand, it reduces the size of the consumer base 
itn , since consumers are attracted to the life 
insurance policies that propose the highest saving rates, and this lowers profits proportional to 
the current markup 
ititit crw  . When the demand is specified as in Equation (13), this trade-
off is summarized by the pricing equation 
 
 
  ititit
ititit
rsr
crw



1
1

. (15) 
 
This expression suggests that, if firms behave in a competitive fashion, the observed markup 
itititit rcrw   should be equal to the inverse of the absolute value of the own-price elasticity 
  itit rs1 . In this expression, all the variables itw , itr , itc , and its  can be computed from 
our dataset. An estimated value ˆ  can be obtained from the demand expression (13). Hence, 
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we can construct a test of whether the observed margin (left-hand side of Equation 15) is 
equal to the theoretical competitive margin (right-hand side of Equation 15). This can be 
performed with a simple t-test. 
 
Collusion 
In a collusive environment, insurance companies set saving rates jointly in order to maximize 
the sum of all firms’ profit, in a similar fashion to what a monopoly would do. In this case, the 
pricing Equation (15) transforms into the following expression: 
 
 
itit
ititit
rsr
crw
0
1



. (16) 
 
This expression suggests that, if firms adopt a collusive behavior, the observed markup 
itititit rcrw   should be equal to the inverse of the absolute value of the own-price elasticity 
irs0 . Once again, in this expression, all the variables itw , itr , itc , and 0s  can be computed 
from our dataset. An estimated value ˆ  can be obtained from the demand expression (13). 
Hence, we can construct a test of whether the observed margin (left-hand side of Equation 16) 
is equal to the theoretical collusive margin (right-hand side of Equation 16). This can, again, 
be performed with a simple t-test. 
 
6.3. Empirical results 
We turn now to the empirical side of our exercise. We first present in this section the 
empirical results associated with the estimation of our demand equation (13). We exploit the 
panel structure of our dataset and estimate firms’ individual fixed-effects together with the 
demand elasticity. We then shed light on a possible re-interpretation of these fixed-effects 
from the perspective of the switching costs that may affect consumers’ mobility from one 
insurer to another. 
The estimation results are presented in Table 6 and Table 7 below. The demand 
Equation (13) is estimated by means of two-stage least squares (2SLS) as the saving rate 
ir  is 
determined simultaneously with the market share 
is  and is therefore endogenous.  
The procedure requires the use of instrumental variables. The instrument we have selected 
is the exogenous variable 
ic , which measures the operating cost of one life insurance contract 
beard by the insurance company. The first-step of the 2SLS procedure consists in, first, 
regressing the endogenous variable 
itrln  on the exogenous instrument itcln  plus a constant, 
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and then, obtaining a predicted 
itrˆ  from the estimated parameters of the equation. The first-
step estimates are presented in Table 6 above. All parameters are significant at the one percent 
level, while the estimated R
2
 is equal to 0.07, which suggests that a reasonable fraction of the 
explained variable 
itrln  is explained by our instrument itcln . 
 
 
Table 6: Estimation results (First step: Dependent variable: 
itrln ) 
 
Variable Estimates 
Constant 
-3.03
***
 
(0.03) 
itcln  
0.04
***
 
(0.00) 
Standard error   
0.05
***
 
(0.00) 
R
2 
0.07 
Number of observations 98 
Note :  Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
***
significant at 1 percent. 
 
 
 
The second step of the 2SLS procedure fits the endogenous variable 
0lnln ssit   on the 
predicted saving rate 
itrˆ  plus a constant and a series of firms’ fixed effects.
7
 The estimates are 
presented in table 7 below (Model 2). Most parameters are significant at the one percent level, 
while the estimated R
2
 is equal to 0.76, which suggests that the fit of the model is quite good. 
The first column of Table 7 (Model 1) presents a simple OLS estimation where the relative 
share 
0lnln ssit   depends on the observed saving rate itr , hence ignoring the potential 
endogenous nature of the explanatory variable. Several comments are worth emphasizing:  
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 The size of the outside alternative is set equivalent to the sum of all the life insurance contracts offered by all 
the insurers of our dataset at t, i.e. 
Ittttt
nnnnn  ...
3210
. Hence, the total number of potential consumers Nt 
is set equal to  
Itttt
nnnn  ...2
321
. Market shares 
it
s  and 
0
s  are computed accordingly. 
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Table 7: Estimation results (Second step: Dependent variable: 
0lnln ssit  ) 
 
Variable 
Estimates 
Model 1 Model 2 
onstant  
-7.27
*** 
(1.70) 
itr  
-0.12 
(1.69) 
 
itrˆ   
130.39
***
 
(42.94) 
FE A  
1.28
***
 
(0.14) 
FE B  
-0.20 
(0.14) 
FE C  
0.90
***
 
(0.14) 
FE D  
2.07
**
 
(0.16) 
FE E  
2.01
***
 
(0.14) 
FE F  
2.30 
(0.16) 
FE G  
3.13
***
 
(0.14) 
FE H  
1.88 
(0.19) 
FE I  
1.60
***
 
(0.14) 
FE J  
1.53 
(0.15) 
FE K  
3.68
***
 
(0.19) 
FE L  
-1.09
***
 
(0.14) 
FE M  
3.34
***
 
(0.17) 
Standard error    
0.26
***
 
(0.00) 
R
2 
 0.76 
Mean log-likelihood 5.550 5.596 
Number of observations 98 98 
Note :  Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
***
significant at 1 percent; 
**
significant at 5 percent; 
*
significant at 10 percent. 
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 A simple OLS estimation is misleading since it suggests that the saving rate 
itr  has no 
significant impact on the relative share 
0lnln ssit  .  
 Our 2SLS model shows that the saving rate 
itr  has a significant and positive impact on 
the relative share 
0lnln ssit  . Thus, according to the economic intuition, consumers 
value higher saving rates. The direct share-saving rate elasticity can be computed as 
    itititititrs rsrrs   . For the average life insurance over our period of 
observation, 08.5rs , which suggests that a 1% increase of the saving rate r  would 
lead to a 5.08% increase in the market share s of the firm. This is a highly elastic 
demand. 
 The firms’ fixed effects vary significantly across productive units. A higher fixed 
effect implies a higher valuation of the observed life insurance company by 
consumers. We discuss this latter result in more details in the next section.  
 
6.4. Firms’ valuation and switching cost 
The individual fixed effects presented in Table 7 indicate how the different life insurance 
companies are ranked according to consumers’ mean valuation. Thus, for instance, Insurer F 
receives a higher mean valuation than Insurer B. This result is obtained everything else being 
equal, i.e., the life insurance product offered by F is preferred upon the one supplied by B 
even if both companies set the same saving rate 
itr .  
 Fixed effects capture product characteristics that are non-observable to us and that 
have a significant impact on the loyalty of consumers to their life insurer. An obvious 
candidate for factors that build loyalty is product quality. Consumers’ utility is higher with 
greater quality and demand increases accordingly.  
 
Another potential candidate is switching cost. We have evaluated these switching costs in 
Section 4. Table 8 below reports the average switching costs estimates obtained for each life 
insurance company and proposes a comparison with the fixed-effects presented in Table 7. It 
suggests that, although fixed-effects are almost systematically higher than our previous 
measures of switching costs, they are usually in the same order of magnitude. Hence, the 
fixed-effects that are estimated through our demand specification (13) may be alternative 
measures of firms’ switching costs, and may potentially include other explanatory factors 
such as quality. A higher switching cost involve higher demand given that consumers are 
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locked-in in this case and find it more difficult to change supplier in order to obtain a better 
commercial deal.  
 
Table 8: Demand fixed-effects and switching costs  
 
Life insurance company Demand fixed-effects Switching costs 
A 1.28 1.13 
B -0.20 0.58 
C 0.90 0.90 
D 2.07 1.61 
E 2.01 1.60 
F 2.30 1.90 
G 3.13 0.72 
H 1.88 1.52 
I 1.60 0.78 
J 1.53 2.21 
K 3.68 2.12 
L -1.09 0.58 
M 3.34 1.91 
 
 
6.5. Testing for competition in the life insurance industry 
We are now ready to test whether the French life insurers adopt or not a competitive behavior. 
We consider a five-step procedure which is described in what follows: 
 Step 1: We estimate the demand Equation (13) in order to retrieve the estimated 
demand elasticity parameter .ˆ  
 Step 2: We plug back the estimated ˆ  in Equations (15) and (16) and obtain values of 
the variables 
iw , ir , ic , and 0s  from the dataset.  
 Step 3: We perform a t-test of the hypothesis compH0  that the left-hand side and the 
right-hand side of Equation (15) are equal.  
 Step 4: We perform a t-test of the hypothesis collH0  that the left-hand side and the 
right-hand side of Equation (16) are equal. 
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 Step 5: If compH0  is not rejected and 
collH0  is rejected, we conclude that the life 
insurance industry is competitive. If compH0  is rejected and 
collH0  is not rejected, we 
conclude that the life insurance industry is not competitive. If compH0  and 
collH0  are 
both rejected, the test is inconclusive.  
The first step of our testing procedure has allowed us to retrieve 39.130ˆ  . In a second 
step, we plug back ˆ  in the right-hand side of Equation (15) and Equation (16) and compute 
  itit rs1ˆ1   and itrs0ˆ1   respectively for each firm i and each period t of our sample. The 
left-hand side of each equation, itititit rcrw   is easily predicted, using observed values of 
the variables 
itw , itr , itc  in the dataset.  
Hence, the t-statistic of the hypothesis compH0  is equal to 1.43, while the t-statistic of the 
hypothesis collH0  is equal to 8.38. This suggests that 
compH0  is not rejected and that 
collH0  is 
rejected. We therefore conclude that the life insurance industry is competitive.  
 
6.6. Robustness check 
An alternative estimation procedure consists in estimating simultaneously the demand and 
pricing expressions pairs (13)-(15), and (13)-(16). Hence, we consider the following two 
systems: 
 
  
 
 






,
1
1
1lnln 0
it
cititit
ittitittit
COM
s
tcrw
trss
S



 (17) 
 
and 
 
  
 






,
1
1lnln
0
0
s
tcrw
trss
S
cititit
ittitittit
COL



 (18) 
 
where COMS  accounts for a pricing condition which assumes that competition is the relevant 
scenario, while COLS  assumes that collusion is the relevant setting. Note that, here, an 
additional trend t is introduced in both demand and pricing expressions. Moreover, it  is not 
considered as a fixed-effect, as in Section 6.3, but is directly obtained from our switching cost 
analysis in Section 4. We thus emphasize the fact that switching costs and saving rates are 
two control variables that have insurers’ profits and consumers’ demand. However, setting a 
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switching cost is a long-run decision while saving rates can be altered in the short run. Our 
demand elasticities in COMS  and COLS  are thus specific to each saving rate itr , but they are 
conditional on the switching costs it . The results are presented in Table 9 below. 
 
Table 9: Demand-pricing system estimation  
 
Variable 
Estimates 
COMS  COLS  
  4.452 (0.75) 4.405 (0.54) 
t  -0.365 (0.06) -0.365 (0.06) 
c  -0.052 (0.01) -0.058 (0.01) 
 
 
To determine whether competition or collusion is the most appropriate scenario, we 
construct a test of COMS  versus COLS . Since the two systems are not nested, we use a test 
proposed by Vuong (1989). The null hypothesis is that both models are equally far from the 
true data-generating process in terms of Kullback-Liebler distances. The alternative 
hypothesis is that one of the two models is closer to the true data-generating process. When 
the Vuong statistic is less than two in absolute value, the test does not favor one model above 
the other. Here, the Vuong statistic is equal to 3.49, which strongly supports the assumption 
that competition fits better the real working of the French insurance industry than collusion. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This article provides a contribution to the evaluation of competition in the life insurance 
industry. Previous studies have proposed different indicators to appraise the strategic behavior 
of the insurers. The menu of possibilities includes questioning whether supplier and consumer 
power is limited or not, or more sophisticated tools which entail the estimation of cost 
functions or cost frontiers in order to identify the potential existence of economies of scale in 
the industry, or the estimation of efficiency indexes for each competitor. It is well accepted 
that scale economies lead to a consolidation of the industry while large efficiency indexes are 
expected in markets with increased competition. Other possibilities are the evaluation of the 
magnitude of the switching costs imposed by firms onto the consumers and the construction 
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of the Boone indicator. In the presence of high switching costs, consumers’ mobility is 
reduced, and competition is therefore limited. The Boone indicator assumes that, in 
competitive markets, efficient firms enjoy higher profit rates.  
This paper revisits two of these methods, namely the evaluation of switching costs and 
the estimation of the Boone indicator, and it proposes a more original contribution based on 
the construction of a structural model. The main results and the conclusion of our analysis are 
as follows:  
 The relative position of French companies in terms of profit  reflects their relative 
efficiency; 
 The industry is characterized by small switching costs, which moreover vary 
significantly from one company to another. In other words, consumers are ready to 
change insurers when they are offered more attractive saving rates; 
 The market conditions of the life insurance industry fits a competitive setting among 
firms proposing differentiated products. 
Taken together, these results suggest that the life insurance industry in France is competitive. 
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